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Which America?: Judge Roger L.
Gregory and the Tradition of
African-American Political Thought
Daniel Fryer*
Abstract
In this Article, written in connection with a symposium
honoring Chief Judge Roger L. Gregory’s twenty years on the
bench, I place Judge Gregory’s jurisprudence within the
tradition of African-American political thought. I suggest that,
at bottom, Judge Gregory has a leveling-up jurisprudence that
seeks to interpret the Constitution in a way that ensures the least
well-off in society are granted the same rights as the most
privileged. This brand of democratic theorizing approximates a
mainstream position by Black political theorists optimistically
seeking to have the least well-off integrated into a fully equal
society. By comparing and contrasting his work with other legal
and political thinkers in this tradition, I sketch an example of
how Judge Gregory uses his role in the judiciary to help shape
an America that lives up to the ideals expressed in its founding
documents.
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I love America more than any other country in this world, and,
exactly for this reason, I insist on the right to criticize her
perpetually.
James Baldwin1
INTRODUCTION
The United States of America has always been a country of
contradictions. At the country’s founding, there was at once a
declaration of the equal rights of all persons and an assignment
of control of the government to white men who owned property.2
We called ourselves the “land of the free” while millions of
enslaved people lived on these lands.3 And today the United
States is regarded as one of the richest societies in history, but
for many important indicators of human development it falls
below some of the poorest nations in the world.4
These contradictions are often amusing to point out, but at
the same time frustrating. It explains how, as depicted in the
epigraph to this paper, one could have extreme admiration for a
country while simultaneously condemning its flaws. It also
1. JAMES BALDWIN, NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 9 (1955).
2. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 384 (1978) (“If the
authors of the Declaration of Independence had said—‘all white men are
created equal’ or even ‘all white men who own property . . .’ they would have
more honestly conveyed the general consensus.” (omission in original)).
3. See J. David Hacker, From ‘20. and Odd’ to 10 Million: The Growth of
the Slave Population in the United States, 41 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 840, 849
(2020) (finding that there were more than one million enslaved people living
in the territory that would become the United States during the American
Revolution).
4. See PETER TEMIN, THE VANISHING MIDDLE CLASS: PREJUDICE AND
POWER IN A DUAL ECONOMY xiii–xiv (2017) (describing the ways in which the
United States resembles developing nations); Sean McElwee, Six Ways
America Is Like a Third-World Country, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 5, 2014, 5:00
PM), https://perma.cc/PAN7-WT4Y (providing examples of how the United
States lags behind lower-income nations in criminal justice, gun violence,
healthcare, education, inequality, and infrastructure).
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illuminates how far we are from realizing the ideals outlined by
the Framers of the Declaration of Independence. Some appear
to live the American dream from birth; but, for others, the
American ideals symbolize false hope.
Commentators have addressed these contradictions in
various ways. The tradition of African-American political
thought has long contrasted at least two responses to this
predicament.5 One strand of reasoning calls for those who are
not afforded the same liberties as the privileged to create a
separate nation where they could reach a level of
self-determination.6 This is the sort of thinking that led Martin
Delany, for example, to recommend complete emigration of
Black people from America.7 Given the hopelessness of
acquiring power in this country, Delany suggested, the best
place to develop power was elsewhere.8 “A new country, and new
beginning,” he professed, “is the only true, rational, politic
remedy for our disadvantageous position.”9
5. See Bernard Boxill, Two Traditions in African American Political
Philosophy, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES AND PHILOSOPHICAL
TRADITIONS 119, 119 (John P. Pittman ed., 1st ed. 1997) (discussing the Black
nationalist and integrationist traditions). Michael C. Dawson goes beyond this
dualism and divides African-American political thought into six ideologies:
Black nationalism, Black feminism, Black Marxism, radical egalitarianism,
disillusioned liberalism, and Black conservatism. See generally MICHAEL C.
DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN-AMERICAN
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES (2001). But even Dawson recognizes that these six
categories are not all-inclusive. See id. at 15 (noting that the author’s chosen
ideologies encapsulate only “the key ones” and that “[t]here is nothing sacred
about the number six”). For the purposes of this essay, I focus on the popular
dualistic approach Boxill employs. However, the ideological categories used
are secondary to detailing how Judge Gregory’s democratic vision connects to
several thinkers in the tradition of African-American political thought.
6. See Boxill, supra note 5, at 124 (stating that the separatist ideal
involved enabling Black Americans to “avoid exploitation by the strong” by
traveling beyond the reach of the powerful and accruing power elsewhere).
7. See id. at 119 (introducing an analysis of Delany’s separatist views).
8. See MARTIN ROBISON DELANY, THE CONDITION, ELEVATION,
EMIGRATION, AND DESTINY OF THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 191
(1852) (“[E]ven were it possible, with the present hate and jealousy that that
the whites have towards us in this country, for us to gain equality of rights
with them; we never could have an equality of the exercise and enjoyment of
those rights. . . .”).
9. Id. at 205. As other scholars have noted, however, Delany was not
merely a Black nationalist. Indeed, in some circumstances Delany appears to
endorse integrationist agendas. See Robert Gooding-Williams, Martin
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A second approach, however, has been less pessimistic.
Rather than give up hope, some have suggested that we use
moral suasion to affirm the humanity in all persons. In this
spirit, Frederick Douglass dismissed the idea that the
disadvantaged could not seek freedom in the United States.10
Given the ideals of universal freedom espoused in the
Constitution, Douglass thought the document should be wielded
as a tool of emancipation for all.11 Rather than dismiss the
contradictions, Douglass sought to reconcile them.12 Embracing
the possibility of an uncontradictory America, Douglass
declared his conviction “that the Constitution, construed in the
light of well-established rules of legal interpretation, might be
made consistent in its details with the noble purposes avowed
in its preamble . . . .”13
All of this may sound a little too far removed from a
symposium honoring Judge Roger L. Gregory. However, I’m
inclined to think that Judge Gregory represents a tradition of
Delany’s Two Principles, the Argument for Emigration, and Revolutionary
Black Nationalism, in AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: A COLLECTED
HISTORY 77 (Melvin L. Rogers & Jack Turner eds., 2021).
10. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Free Negro’s Place is in America, 1851,
in FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITING 176, 177 (Philip S.
Foner ed., 1999) (“[A] large portion of the American people desire to get rid of
us. In proportion to the strength of their desire to have us go, in just that
proportion is the strength of our determination to stay, and in staying we ask
nothing but justice.”).
11. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Change of Opinion Announced, 1851, in
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITING, supra note 10, at 174
(“[H]ereafter we should . . . demand that [the Constitution] be wielded in
behalf of emancipation.”).
12. See Nick Bromell, A “Voice from the Enslaved”: The Origins of
Frederick Douglass’s Political Philosophy of Democracy, 23 AM. LITERARY HIST.
697, 711 (2011) (noting that Douglass’s way of thinking “creates a framework
that allows contraries to co-exist in a tense, dynamic relation with each other”).
13. Douglass, supra note 11, at 173. It is worth noting, however, that
Douglass’s position on the legitimacy of the American government changed
over time. Following William Lloyd Garrison, Douglass initially endorsed the
view that the Constitution was a slaver’s document that lacked legitimacy. See
DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PROPHET OF FREEDOM 214 (2018)
(describing how the Constitution became Douglass’s “intensive focus” as “the
base of slavery’s stranglehold on America”). But by the early 1850s, Douglass
began to see the Constitution as possessing the necessary principles for
freedom and equality for all. Id. at 216–17. Those principles—especially as
detailed in the preamble—provide the tools necessary for the Constitution to
become a source of freedom and justice for all Americans. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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African-American political thought that strives to advance the
democratic principles that America stands on instead of
dismissing them as lofty ideals. In this sense, he follows
Douglass in wielding the Constitution to advance freedom for all
and encouraging society to live up to its avowed principles.
Below I’m going to sketch a few key elements of Judge Gregory’s
underlying democratic theory to make this case. At bottom,
Judge Gregory has a leveling-up jurisprudence that seeks to
ensure the least well-off are afforded the same legal protections
as the most privileged in our society.
Two points are worth emphasizing at the outset. First, as
with any interpretative venture like the one I am engaging in,
there will be a risk of projecting on the subject beliefs that they
may not hold themselves. This is especially true when trying to
derive a political theory out of writings restricted by
constitutional standards that govern judicial review,14 and the
norms of judicial opinion writing, that are never explained in a
systematic way. I make no claim to completely evade some level
of projecting here. But it is important to note that Judge Gregory
also likes to place his role on the bench within the tradition of
African-American legal and political thinkers.15 That he sees
himself in that tradition is at least some reason to believe he
belongs there. But we may also want to question whether that
self-perception is warranted, and, if so, where exactly does he
14. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (discussing the limitations on judicial
review).
15. In his opinions, for instance, Judge Gregory references the works of
African-American political theorists to illuminate the impact of the legal issue
at stake. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 332 (4th Cir. 2020)
(Gregory, C.J., concurring) (referencing the works of Frederick Douglass,
James Baldwin, and other African-American political theorists to explain the
importance of affirming a decision upholding everyone’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures). In interviews, Judge Gregory notes
longstanding affiliations with African-American bar associations as among the
most important to him. See, e.g., Judge Willie J. Epps Jr., An Interview with
Judge Roger L. Gregory, ABA (Nov. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z8SQ-G9HE
(discussing the Old Dominion Bar and National Bar Associations). Indeed,
even in his closing remarks for the Symposium from which this essay is
inspired, Judge Gregory paid homage to several African-American legal and
political theorists who inspire his thinking about the legal issues that each
panel addressed: Fannie Lou Hamer for his views on voting rights; Sojourner
Truth for his views on reproductive rights and gender justice; Ida B. Wells for
his views on criminal justice and antiracism; and Constance Baker Motley for
his thoughts on the future of the judiciary.
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fall within that tradition? These are the questions I want to
engage here.
The other point worth emphasizing is the position from
which Judge Gregory writes. Familiar in African-American
political thought are challenges to live up to the democratic
ideals of this nation, levied against institutions by those who are
targets of those institutions. Thus, the tradition brings to mind
critiques by those born to an enslaved parent,16 those born in
bondage themselves,17 anti-lynching crusaders,18 antiracism
activists,19 or persons who have fallen victim to racial
criminalization.20 These external criticisms often serve as
poignant evaluations of our legal systems, and their
shortcomings, and provide a critical standpoint to understand
the effect of our systems’ malfunctions. But perhaps just as
significant are internal critiques—that is, evaluations by
persons who have prominent positions in the legal systems that
are being challenged to create a better America. With the
increased presence of Black Americans in leadership positions
16. See, e.g., DAVID WALKER, APPEAL TO THE COLOURED CITIZENS OF THE
WORLD 4–5 (3d ed. 1830) (“I appeal to Heaven for my motive in writing—who
knows that my object is, if possible, to awaken in the breasts of my afflicted,
degraded and slumbering brethren, a spirit of inquiry and investigation
respecting our miseries and wretchedness in this Republican Land of
Liberty!!!!!!”).
17. See, e.g., FREDERICK DOUGLASS, My Slave Experience in Maryland, in
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITING, supra note 10, at 13
You, the people of . . . the whole Northern States, have sworn under
God that we shall be slaves or die! And shall we three millions be
taunted with a want of the love of freedom, by the very men who
stand upon us and say, submit, or be crushed?
18. See, e.g., IDA B. WELLS, SOUTHERN HORRORS: LYNCH LAW IN ALL ITS
PHASES 1 (1892) (“The Afro-American is not a bestial race. If this work can
contribute . . . toward proving this, and . . . arouse the conscience of the
American people to a demand for justice to every citizen, and punishment by
law for the lawless, I shall feel I have done my race a service.”).
19. See, e.g., Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the
Civil Rights Movement, COMMENTARY, Feb. 1965, at 7 (“[W]e can agitate the
right questions by probing at the contradictions which still stand in the way of
the ‘Great Society.’ The questions having been asked, motion must begin in
the larger society, for there is a limit to what Negroes can do alone.”).
20. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail,
LIBERATION: AN INDEP. MONTHLY, June 1963, at 10–16 (advocating for direct
action against unjust laws); MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, LIVE FROM DEATH ROW 11–16
(Harper Collins ed., 1996) (critiquing racial disparities in the numbers of
individuals on death row in America).
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in the United States,21 more opportunities are presented to
evaluate those who have a commitment to bettering the
condition of historically disempowered citizens and the
authority to hold our legal and political institutions accountable.
By focusing on what Judge Gregory has referred to as his “view
from the bench,”22 these brief remarks are a call to engage with
internal critiques of our legal and political systems by Black
theorists who have roles within these institutions.
I. A VIEW FROM THE BENCH
Judge Gregory does not hide his aspirations to use the
Constitution to advance a cause of freedom for all in our society.
As he puts it: “That’s what the rule of law means; it’s about
sharing the blessings of equality and justice with all. It is not
mere generosity because our Constitution requires no less from
our legal system.”23 Thus, when he feels his colleagues do not
fully appreciate what it means for vulnerable persons to lose the
“intangible collection of aspirations that we have come to call
the American Dream,”24 he does not mince his words. “This
Circuit’s tolerance for the oppression of some people is
disheartening,”25 he wrote when the Fourth Circuit refused to
rehear a case concluding that a live-in housekeeper did not face
persecution when her home was destroyed by a
21. See Anna Brown & Sara Atske, Black Americans Have Made Gains in
U.S. Political Leadership, but Gaps Remain, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/D7MF-2NBB (discussing the upward trajectory of Black
political leadership over the past several decades). This, however, is not to
suggest that Black persons have not held significant positions in our legal and
political institutions in the past. Indeed, even Frederick Douglass, who is
discussed often in this essay, held government positions later in life. But
Douglass’s attempt to seek political reform by occupying political positions is
often criticized as self-serving and complicit—and his political insight at that
time is often viewed as “dull.” See Sharon R. Krause, Frederick Douglass:
Nonsovereign Freedom and the Plurality of Political Resistance, in
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: A COLLECTED HISTORY 139 (Melvin L.
Rogers & Jack Turner eds., 2021) (discussing criticisms of Douglass).
22. Michael Marshall, Faith in Law Key to Black Struggle, Gregory Says,
UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L. (Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Michael Marshall],
https://perma.cc/GA2B-3MUJ.
23. Epps, supra note 15.
24. Mirisawo v. Holder, 616 F.3d 594, 595 (4th Cir. 2010) (Gregory, J.,
dissenting in denial of rehearing en banc).
25. Id.
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government-sponsored militia.26 His commitment to a reading
of the Constitution as a guarantor of justice and equality for all
guides his historically informed jurisprudence to follow the
claims of justice to its full extent.
It may be tempting at first to dismiss the preceding
sentence as a general platitude that could be said about anyone
in robes. But this would be a mistake. There are several judges
who display greater skepticism of the Constitution, or even our
laws in general, as a guarantor of justice. This is even true of
Black jurists thought to be writing in the tradition of
African-American political thought. Take, for instance, Justice
Clarence Thomas who writes from the Black nationalist and
Black conservative traditions.27 Rather than seeing the law as a
source of social justice, Justice Thomas has expressed his
skepticism for those who look to the law to solve many of our
social problems. Speaking at Clark College, a historically Black
college in Atlanta, Thomas declared that “[p]roblems of racial
inequality cannot be solved by the law—even civil rights law.”28
For Justice Thomas, “government was and is one of the major
culprits in the problems of black Americans.”29 Far from
embracing the integrationist position, Justice Thomas claims
that a universal rejection of separatism implies a view of Black
inferiority.30 And far from embracing the law as a tool for justice,
Justice Thomas scorns courts using their authority in an
aggressive manner—even when motivated by a worthy goal.31
26. Id. at 594 (empathizing with the plight of Rosemary Mirisawo, the
housekeeper who lost her home).
27. See COREY ROBIN, THE ENIGMA OF CLARENCE THOMAS 105–09 (2019)
(discussing how Justice Thomas weaves together the Black nationalist and
conservative traditions).
28. Id. at 95 (internal quotations omitted).
29. Id. at 94 (internal quotations omitted).
30. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
After all, if separation itself is a harm, and if integration therefore
is the only way that blacks can receive a proper education, then
there must be something inferior about blacks. Under this theory,
segregation injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own
cannot achieve. To my way of thinking, that conclusion is the result
of a jurisprudence based upon a theory of black inferiority.
31. See id. at 124
As with any inherent judicial power, however, we ought to be
reluctant to approve its aggressive or extravagant use, and instead
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Whereas Justice Thomas appears closer to the Black
nationalists who seek to convince Black people to give up the
illusion that government actors could positively affect their
condition,32 Judge Gregory seems to follow Douglass toward an
integrationist agenda that believes the Constitution could be
“wielded in behalf of emancipation”33 for those who are
oppressed.
And—in case you were wondering—this isn’t just a
liberal/conservative split. Even well-known Black liberal jurists
are quick to dismiss the Constitution as a glorious liberty
document. Indeed, because of its contradictions, many Black
writers have been less optimistic about the words in the
document being used for liberation.34 Justice Thurgood
Marshall, for example, did not have any problem scrapping the
idea that the Framers of the Constitution exhibited a profound
sense of justice.35 He dismissed such an affinity to “a written
document now yellowed with age.”36 And he advocated for a
living constitution that was equipped “to meet the challenges of
a changing society.”37
But you won’t get this level of dismissal towards our
founding documents from Judge Gregory. He, no doubt,
we should exercise it in a manner consistent with our history and
traditions. Motivated by our worthy desire to eradicate segregation,
however, we have disregarded this principle and given the courts
unprecedented authority to shape a remedy in equity. (internal
citations omitted).
32. See Robin, supra note 27, at 105 (“As [Justice Thomas] sees it, the
combination of white racism, racial inequality, and the small size of the black
electorate make it impossible for African Americans, acting as a self-conscious,
self-identified, coherent group, to achieve a foothold, much less win any
concrete or permanent gains, in the political sphere.”).
33. Douglass, supra note 11, at 202–03.
34. See CHARLES MILLS, BLACKNESS VISIBLE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
RACE 172 (1998) (“Most blacks have viewed the Constitution more
ambivalently than Douglass did, and few today would endorse his
interpretation of ‘original intent.’”).
35. Thurgood Marshall, Racial Justice and the Constitution: A View from
the Bench, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 314, 315
(John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995) [hereinafter Thurgood
Marshall] (“I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever
‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and
sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly profound.”).
36. Id. at 314.
37. Id. at 317.
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acknowledges their shortcomings and the progress that still
needs to be made. But he also sees the founding documents as
providing the framework for freedom.38 Judge Gregory’s
jurisprudence is grounded in admiration for the Framer’s
project.39 And he appeals to it when spotting an injustice that he
finds inconsistent with the written law.40 Thus, when dissenting
from the Fourth Circuit’s decision not to grant a writ of habeas
corpus for a prisoner who the government and district court
agreed received an unjust sentence, Judge Gregory remarked
that the decision failed to “guard against a morbid
encroachment upon that which is so precious our Framers
ensured its continued vitality in our Constitution.”41 Whereas
Judge Gregory is willing to give the Framers credit for creating
a document that served as inspiration for the oppressed,42
Justice Marshall goes against the tradition of Douglass and
declares such credit unwarranted.43
II. PUTTING THE VIEW IN CONTEXT
There are many deeper issues that I am intentionally
evading in this hasty sketch of these icons’ views. Yes, a lot of
Justice Marshall’s criticisms are more appropriately leveled
against those who treat the original intent of the Framers with
a saint-like status, and only a few of them are more
appropriately directed at fidelity to the original text that Judge

38. See Michael Marshall, supra note 22 (“It is a tribute to our forefathers
that they laid the framework of freedom. It’s a great nation and I’m proud to
be on the federal court, but there’s a ways to go.”).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 276 (4th Cir. 2015)
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (invoking the court’s “solemn responsibility” to uphold
the ideals of the Framers).
40. See, e.g., id. at 273–76 (discussing the Court’s duty to properly apply
the writ of habeas corpus where the defendant received an excessive sentence,
but the majority did not right the wrong).
41. Id. at 276.
42. See Michael Marshall, supra note 22 (“‘Blacks had hope for freedom
when the colonies won independence,’ Gregory said, ‘hopeful because of the
language of the Declaration of Independence.’”).
43.
Thurgood Marshall, supra note 35, at 317 (“‘We the People’ no longer
enslave, but the credit does not belong to the framers.”).

WHICH AMERICA?

1097

Gregory (and Frederick Douglass) employ.44 And, sure, Justice
Thomas does not appear to adhere to the principles of
separatism in the way that Black political theorists of the
nineteenth and early-twentieth century did.45 Even in his more
provocative moments,46 Justice Thomas seems to be saying that
the job of the judiciary is to guarantee desegregation—not
integration.47 No doubt a more careful analysis than the one that
I am able to provide here would also show that the countless
similarities between these jurists far outweigh the differences.48
Still, stressing these differences shows the intellectual
particularities of Judge Gregory and where he fits in this
ideological tradition. My main point here is that Judge Gregory
mirrors Frederick Douglass in his appreciation of the Framers’
project and his desire to use the Constitution as a tool for social
uplift. Justice Thomas shares an appreciation for the Framers’
project, but he does not put much stock into the idea that the
Constitution is a tool for social uplift. And Justice Marshall
viewed a (living) Constitution as a tool for social uplift, but he
does not put much stock into the Framers’ project. By doing

44. Compare supra notes 35, 43 and accompanying text (critiquing the
Framers), with supra note 36 and accompanying text (critiquing the
Constitution).
45. As some scholars have recently pointed out, even Martin Delany, who
is considered the “father” of Black nationalism, altered his nationalist view
depending on the personal or political issues in front of him. See generally
Robert Gooding-Williams, Martin Delany’s Two Principles, the Argument for
Emigration, and Revolutionary Black Nationalism, in AFRICAN AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT: A COLLECTED HISTORY 77 (Melvin L. Rogers & Jack
Turner eds., 2021).
46. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are willing to assume
that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.”).
47. See id. at 122 (“[M]ere de facto segregation (unaccompanied by
discriminatory inequalities in educational resources) does not constitute a
continuing harm after the end of de jure segregation.”); cf. Tommie Shelby,
Integration, Inequality, and Imperatives of Justice: A Review Essay, 42 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFS. 253, 274 (2014) (“[R]acial justice requires desegregation and
economic fairness but does not require residential integration or proscribe
voluntary self-segregation in neighborhoods.”).
48. Indeed, since Judge Gregory views Thurgood Marshall as the greatest
judge to ever live, see Epps, supra note 15, it would be easy to detail the various
similarities between the two jurists. And, of course, it is possible that some of
the differences between the two could be attributed to the different courts in
which they serve.
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both, Judge Gregory allows us to see how the project Frederick
Douglass employed may look from the bench. It also allows us
to see what happens when someone attempts to manage the
contradictions behind the original liberal claim that “We the
People” are free and equal, instead of rising above them. This
ability to maintain consistency—which Anna Julia Cooper
called “stable equilibrium of opposition,”49 and Ralph Ellison
called “an attitude of antagonistic cooperation”50—is the
hallmark of a mainstream position by African-American
political theorists seeking to have the least well-off integrated
into a society where they can enjoy the constitutional
protections afforded to the most privileged.51
So what does this integrationist democratic project look like
from Judge Gregory’s perspective? Well, it starts by
acknowledging that, as Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote, “we are
tied together in a single garment of destiny, caught in an
inescapable network of mutuality.”52 And it precludes the
erosion of any constitutional protection because persons are a
member of “a certain demographic.”53 We all fall or rise together.
It provides the appropriate level of scrutiny to a government’s
attempt to disregard individual rights with inappropriate
race-based classifications.54 And even while acknowledging that
49. ANNA JULIA COOPER, Has America a Race Problem? If So, How Can It
Best Be Solved?, in THE VOICE OF ANNA JULIA COOPER 121, 128 (Charles Lemert
& Esme Bhan, eds., 1998).
50. RALPH ELLISON, The Little Man at Chehaw Station, in GOING TO THE
TERRITORY 3, 7 (1986).
51. See Bromell, supra note 12, at 698 (discussing how Douglass’s
theorizing about democracy “self-consciously inaugurat[es] a distinctively
African-American tradition of political thought about U.S. democracy).
Howard McGary notes that, along with Douglass, the major figures in this
tradition include Booker T. Washington, Martin Luther King, Jr., the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, and the National Urban League. HOWARD MCGARY,
RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 52–53 (1999).
52. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 542 (4th Cir. 2013) (Gregory, J.)
(quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., Remaining Awake Through a Great
Revolution, Address at the National Cathedral, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 31,
1968)).
53. See id. (“[W]e must ensure that the Fourth Amendment rights of all
individuals are protected.”).
54. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 604 (M.D.N.C. 2016)
(Gregory, J.) (“Laws that classify citizens based on race are constitutionally
suspect and therefore subject to strict scrutiny; racially gerrymandered
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there appear to be “two Americas,” it attempts to bridge the gap
by assuring “that there truly is equal protection under the
law.”55 For Judge Gregory, Black history is “the same as
American history,”56 and the way to end the division is to strive
for King’s dream of national unity. Which America is worth
loving? The one that is open to perpetual criticism until the
universal equality and freedom expressed in the Declaration of
Independence is extended to all.
CONCLUSION
Writing these remarks has required me to practice an
extreme level of restraint. I have tried to make sense of the topic
at hand using Judge Gregory’s public opinions, speeches, and
interviews. And—in the spirit of Judge Gregory and Frederick
Douglass—I’ve attempted to stick close to the text while
proffering views about where he may sit in the tradition of
African-American political thought. In this sense, these
“neutral” observations have primarily been an exercise in
understanding, not assessment. They have also excluded
observations based on the personal relationship that I have with
someone I consider a mentor, friend, and one of the best legal
minds to serve in robes.
Still, I can’t shake the sense that this purportedly neutral
approach robs any potential reader of actually engaging Judge
Gregory’s contributions as a work of African-American political
thought,57 misconstrues his optimism, and fails to communicate
districting schemes are no different, even when adopted for benign purposes.”),
aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
55. United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 334 (4th Cir. 2020) (Gregory,
C.J., concurring). For a discussion of how Judge Gregory’s “tour de force
concurring opinion” fits within a larger critique of the policing of Black people
in the United States, see Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing With
the Thirteenth Amendment, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1108, 1114–18 (2020).
56. Michael Marshall, supra note 22; cf. Douglass, supra note 10, at 177
(“[S]imultaneously with the landing of the Pilgrims, there landed slaves on the
shores of this continent, and . . . for two hundred and thirty years and more
we have had a foothold on this continent.”).
57. As Tommie Shelby and Brandon Terry write:
The approach to black political thought that we favor also rejects
hagiography. Black thinkers are due far more respect and attention
than they typically receive from political philosophers. They should
not, however, be uncritically celebrated or treated as oracles of
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the pride that Judge Gregory has as an American. Let me
conclude with one final thought to slightly mitigate these
concerns.
Judge Gregory once said something to me along the lines of:
“It’s easy to be a patriot when society is structured to your
benefit; it’s much harder to be a patriot in a country where the
cards are stacked against you from birth.” As I reflect on, and
write about, race relations in this country, I return to that
statement often. Although Frederick Douglass is sometimes
referred to as “the greatest American of all time,”58 it may be a
stretch to call him a patriot.59 I believe Judge Gregory, though,
is a patriot—despite living in a society where many cards were
stacked against him from birth.60 Indeed, I’m not sure I know a
better American. His faith, upbringing, and love of history
contributed to his idea that, as a public servant, he could use his
position in our judicial system to share the “blessings of equality
and justice with all.”61
Is this idealistic vision a bit too optimistic? Perhaps.62 Are
protestors on to something when they suggest that no amount
near-divine wisdom. Criticism and disagreement are often
appropriate, and necessary.
TOMMIE SHELBY & BRANDON TERRY, TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD: ESSAYS ON THE
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 6 (2018).
58. BLIGHT, supra note 13, at xvi.
59. See, e.g., FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Letter to William Lloyd Garrison,
January 1, 1846, in FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITING,
supra note 10, at 17 (“That men should be patriotic is to me perfectly natural;
and as a philosophical fact, I am able to give it an intellectual recognition. But
no further can I go. If ever I had any patriotism, or any capacity for the feeling,
it was whipt out of me long since by the lash of the American soul-drivers.”)
60. See, e.g., Michael Marshall, supra note 22 (“Gregory said it is a
testimony to the American Dream that he could one day serve on the Court of
Appeals . . . . ‘Our nation gives people a chance to become the people they
believe they might want to become.’”).
61. See Epps, supra note 15 (discussing Judge Gregory’s upbringing and
his commitments as a public servant).
62. Here, I am regrettably reminded of the remorse Kenneth Clark, the
Black psychologist who provided critical testimony about the harmful effects
of segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, expressed in his later years:
I write these words in my seventy-sixth year. My beloved wife is
dead and my career is nearing an end. Reluctantly, I am forced to
face the likely possibility that the United States will never rid itself
of racism and reach true integration. I look back and I shudder at
how naive we all were in our belief in the steady progress racial
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of reform will achieve the level of freedom for all required by
justice? Perhaps.63 Are there times when it appears that Judge
Gregory’s project of leveling up is being ignored by some of his
colleagues? Perhaps.64 Is the country better off having Judge
Gregory in the position to take up the cause of freedom and
justice for all? That’s an easy and emphatic: yes!

minorities would make through programs of litigation and
education. . . . I am forced to recognize that my life has, in fact, been
a series of glorious defeats.
Kenneth B. Clark, Racial Progress and Retreat: A Personal Memoir, in RACE
IN AMERICA 3, 15 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993).
63. Judge Gregory would likely find some truth in Douglass’s attestation
that Black persons in prominent positions are a form of political resistance
because it alters the public image of Black Americans. See Krause, supra note
21, at 139 (“[Douglass] also felt that a black man in political office was in itself
a form of political resistance because of the multiple ways it contested the color
line and modeled a new public image of African Americans.”).
64. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.

